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Maximum Metric Spanning Tree made Byzantine Tolerant
Swan Dubois∗ Toshimitsu Masuzawa† Se´bastien Tixeuil‡
Abstract
Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed
system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories
in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits
to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors. This paper focus on systems that are both self-
stabilizing and Byzantine tolerant.
We consider the well known problem of constructing a maximum metric tree in this context.
Combining these two properties is known to induce many impossibility results. In this paper, we
provide first two impossibility results about the construction of maximum metric tree in presence
of transients and (permanent) Byzantine faults. Then, we provide a new self-stabilizing protocol
that provides optimal containment of an arbitrary number of Byzantine faults.
Keywords Byzantine fault, Distributed protocol, Fault tolerance, Stabilization, Spanning tree
construction
1 Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of
faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [2,
3, 16] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults,
while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [12] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number
of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is
appealing yet proved difficult [4, 1, 15] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Related Works A promizing path towards multitolerance to both transient and Byzantine faults
is Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such
as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was
proposed [15, 14]. Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside
which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it
possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it
turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those. To circumvent impossibility
results, the weaker notion of strong stabilization was proposed [13, 7]: here, correct nodes outside
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the containment radius may be perturbated by the actions of Byzantine node, but only a finite
number of times.
Recently, the idea of generalizing strict and strong stabilization to an area that depends on the
graph topology and the problem to be solved rather than an arbitrary fixed containment radius was
proposed [5, 6] and denoted by topology aware strict (and strong) stabilization. When maximizable
metric trees are considered, [5] proposed an optimal (with respect to impossibility results) protocol
for topology-aware strict stabilization, and for the simpler case of breath-first-search metric trees,
[6] presented a protocol that is optimal both with respect to strict and strong variants of topology-
aware stabilization. The case of optimality for topology-aware strong stabilization in the general
maximal metric case remains open.
Our Contribution In this paper, we investigate the possibility of topology-aware strong stabi-
lization for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends
on n the size of the network), and focus on the maximum metric tree problem. Our contribution
in this paper is threefold. First, we provide two impossibility results for self-stabilizing maximum
metric tree construction in presence of Byzantine faults. In more details, we characterize a specific
class of maximizable metrics (which includes breath-first-search and shortest path metrics) that
prevents the existence of strong stabilizing solutions and we generalize an impossibilty result of
[6] that provides a lower bound on the containmemt area for topology-aware strong stabilization
(Section 3). Second, we provide a topology-aware strongly stabilizing protocol that matches this
lower bound on the containment area (Section 4). Finally, we provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a strongly stabilizing solution (Section 5).
2 Model, Definitions and Previous Results
2.1 State Model
A distributed system S = (V,L) consists of a set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of processes and a set L
of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct
processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is V and whose
link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S. We use the following
notations: n = |V |, m = |L| and d(u, v) denotes the distance between two processes u and v (i.e
the length of the shortest path between u and v).
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is
denoted by Nv. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process. Instead we
assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally labeling them.
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single
process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical. We adopt the shared
state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process can directly read the
states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take
actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an
atomic manner by the process. The action executed by each process is described by a finite set
of guarded actions of the form 〈guard〉 −→ 〈statement〉. Each guard of process u is a boolean
expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
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A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product
of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed
system S. For a process set R ⊆ V and two configurations ρ and ρ′, we denote ρ
R
7→ ρ′ when ρ
changes to ρ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ′
can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we
should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The
action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result
of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ′.
We say that a process is enabled in a configuration ρ if the guard of at least one of its actions
is evaluated as true in ρ.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R1, R2, . . .
be a schedule, where Ri ⊆ V holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies
ρi−1
Ri
7→ ρi for each i (i ≥ 1). Process actions are executed atomically, and we distinguish some
properties on the scheduler (or daemon). A distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes
such that any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions. We say that the daemon
is central if it schedules action of only one process at any step. The set of all possible executions
from ρ0 ∈ C is denoted by Eρ0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is,
E =
⋃
ρ∈C Eρ. We consider asynchronous distributed systems but we add the following assumption
on schedules: any schedule is strongly fair (that is, it is impossible for any process to be infinitely
often enabled without executing its action in an execution) and k-bounded (that is, it is impossible
for any process to execute more than k actions between two consecutive action executions of any
other process).
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantine-
faulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine
process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily. For a given execution, the number of
faulty processes is arbitrary but we assume that the root process is never faulty.
2.2 Self-Stabilizing Protocols Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to
find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem,
while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification
predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with
a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on
variables of Pv (⊆ V ) where Pv is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The
variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables). In what
follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol ([2]) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration,
where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a
legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec(v).
From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type
of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient
faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process cor-
rectly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently
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faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In
addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to
satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [15] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing
protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process) A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and
located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
Definition 2 ((c, f)-containment) A configuration ρ is (c, f)-contained for specification spec if,
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v
always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [15]. The parameter
f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [15] dealt with unbounded number
of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f)-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f)-strictly stabilizing for specification
spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration
ρi that is (c, f)-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [15] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. In-
tuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two
processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine
tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For
some (global) problems r can not be bounded by a constant. In consequence, we can show that
there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for such a problem for any (finite) integer c.
Strong stabilization To circumvent such impossibility results, [7] defines a weaker notion than
the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may
exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to
Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of
Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number
of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
In the following of this section, we recall the formal definition of strong stabilization adopted in
[7]. From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations
are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is c-legitimate for spec if every
c-correct process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is c-stable if every c-correct process
never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
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Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system even-
tually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be
disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The
c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes
and is defined as follows
Definition 6 (c-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρt (t > 1) is a c-disruption if
and only if the following holds:
1. e is finite,
2. e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and
4. ρt is the first configuration after ρ0 such that ρt is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable.
Now we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact
processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes
execute an infinite number of actions.
Definition 7 ((t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration) A configuration ρ0 is (t, k, c, f)-time
contained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are satisfied:
1. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable,
2. every execution starting from ρ0 contains a c-legitimate configuration for spec after which the
values of all the O-variables of c-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzantine
processes make actions repeatedly and forever),
3. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most t c-disruptions, and
4. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-
variables for each c-correct process.
Definition 8 ((t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol) A protocol A is (t, c, f)-strongly stabiliz-
ing if and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involving at most f
Byzantine processes contains a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration that is reached after at most
l rounds. Parameters l and k are respectively the (t, c, f)-stabilization time and the (t, c, f)-process-
disruption times of A.
Note that a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a (c, f)-contained configuration when
t = k = 0, and thus, (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of
a (c, f)-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly
stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to
Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-
stabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do
not require each process to know the values of the parameters.
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Topology-aware Byzantine resilience We saw previously that there exist a number of impos-
sibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictive specifications. To circumvent
this impossibility result, we describe here another weaker notion than the strict stabilization: the
topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA strict stabilization for short) introduced by [5].
Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may
be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine pro-
cesses (i.e. the set of processes at distance at most c from a Byzantine process) but can be defined
depending on the graph topology and Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From
now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB (which is function of B) denotes a subset of
V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes).
Definition 9 (SB-correct node) A node is SB-correct if it is a correct node ( i.e. not Byzantine)
which not belongs to SB.
Definition 10 (SB-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is SB-legitimate for spec if ev-
ery SB-correct node v is legitimate for spec ( i.e. if spec(v) holds).
Definition 11 ((SB, f)-topology-aware containment) A configuration ρ0 is (SB , f)-topology-
aware contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . ., every configuration is SB-legitimate and every SB-correct process never changes its
O-variables.
The parameter SB of Definition 11 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs
to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly
to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 12 ((SB, f)-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (SB , f)-topology-
aware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration ρi that is (SB , f)-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB =
{
v ∈ V |min
b∈B
(d(v, b)) ≤ c
}
,
then a (SB , f)-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f)-strictly stabilizing protocol.
Then, the concept of topology-aware strict stabilization is a generalization of the strict stabilization.
However, note that a TA strictly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing
protocol (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes). The
parameter SB is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each
process to know the actual definition of the set.
Similarly to topology-aware strict stabilization, we can weaken the notion of strong stabilization
using the notion of containment area. This idea was introduced by [6]. We recall in the following
the formal definition of this concept.
Definition 13 (SB-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is SB-stable if every SB-correct pro-
cess never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
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Definition 14 (SB-TA-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρt (t > 1) is a SB-
TA-disruption if and only if the followings hold:
1. e is finite,
2. e contains at least one action of a SB-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ0 is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable, and
4. ρt is the first configuration after ρ0 such that ρt is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable.
Definition 15 ((t, k, SB , f)-TA time contained configuration) A configuration ρ0 is (t, k, SB ,
f)-TA time contained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are
satisfied:
1. ρ0 is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable,
2. every execution starting from ρ0 contains a SB-legitimate configuration for spec after which
the values of all the O-variables of SB-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzan-
tine processes make actions repeatedly and forever),
3. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most t SB-TA-disruptions, and
4. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-
variables for each SB-correct process.
Definition 16 ((t, SB, f)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol) A protocol A is (t, SB , f)-TA
strongly stabilizing if and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involv-
ing at most f Byzantine processes contains a (t, k, SB , f)-TA-time contained configuration that is
reached after at most l rounds of each SB-correct node. Parameters l and k are respectively the
(t, SB , f)-stabilization time and the (t, SB , f)-process-disruption time of A.
2.3 Maximum Metric Tree Construction
In this work, we deal with maximum (routing) metric trees as defined in [10]. Informally, the goal
of a routing protocol is to construct a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all
of the nodes with respect to some total ordering ≺. In the following, we recall all definitions and
notations introduced in [10].
Definition 17 (Routing metric) A routing metric (or just metric) is a five-tuple (M,W,met,mr,
≺) where:
1. M is a set of metric values,
2. W is a set of edge weights,
3. met is a metric function whose domain is M ×W and whose range is M ,
4. mr is the maximum metric value in M with respect to ≺ and is assigned to the root of the
system,
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5. ≺ is a less-than total order relation over M that satisfies the following three conditions for
arbitrary metric values m, m′, and m′′ in M :
(a) irreflexivity: m 6≺ m,
(b) transitivity : if m ≺ m′ and m′ ≺ m′′ then m ≺ m′′,
(c) totality: m ≺ m′ or m′ ≺ m or m = m′.
Any metric value m ∈M \ {mr} satisfies the utility condition (that is, there exist w0, . . . , wk−1 in
W and m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk = m in M such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1)).
For instance, we provide the definition of four classical metrics with this model: the shortest
path metric (SP), the flow metric (F), and the reliability metric (R). Note also that we can
modelise the construction of a spanning tree with no particular constraints in this model using the
metric NC described below and the construction of a BFS spanning tree using the shortest path
metric (SP) with W1 = {1} (we denoted this metric by BFS in the following).
SP = (M1,W1,met1,mr1,≺1) F = (M2,W2,met2,mr2,≺2)
where M1 = N where mr2 ∈ N
W1 = N M2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
met1(m,w) = m+ w W2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
mr1 = 0 met2(m,w) = min{m,w}
≺1 is the classical > relation ≺2 is the classical < relation
R = (M3,W3,met3,mr3,≺3) NC = (M4,W4,met4,mr4,≺4)
where M3 = [0, 1] where M4 = {0}
W3 = [0, 1] W4 = {0}
met3(m,w) = m ∗ w met4(m,w) = 0
mr3 = 1 mr4 = 0
≺3 is the classical < relation ≺4 is the classical < relation
Definition 18 (Assigned metric) An assigned metric over a system S is a six-tuple (M,W,met,
mr,≺, wf) where (M,W,met,mr,≺) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of
S a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be a simple path from a process v to the root r. The next set of
definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over a given system S.
Definition 19 (Metric of a rooted path) The metric of a rooted path in S is the prefix sum
of met over the edge weights in the path and mr.
For example, if a rooted path p in S is vk, . . . , v0 with v0 = r, then the metric of p is mk =
met(mk−1, wf({vk, vk−1})) with ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},mi = met(mi−1, wf({vi, vi−1}) and m0 = mr.
Definition 20 (Maximum metric path) A rooted path p from v in S is called a maximum
metric path with respect to an assigned metric if and only if for every other rooted path q from v
in S, the metric of p is greater than or equal to the metric of q with respect to the total order ≺.
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Definition 21 (Maximum metric of a node) The maximum metric of a node v 6= r (or simply
metric value of v) in S is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum
metric of r is mr.
Definition 22 (Maximum metric tree) A spanning tree T of S is a maximum metric tree with
respect to an assigned metric over S if and only if every rooted path in T is a maximum metric
path in S with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [10] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a
maximum metric tree. More formally, the definition follows.
Definition 23 (Maximizable metric) A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assign-
ment of this metric over any system S, there is a maximum metric tree for S with respect to the
assigned metric.
Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the aim of this work is to study the
construction of a maximum metric tree with respect to M which spans the system in a self-
stabilizing way in a system subject to permanent Byzantine faults (but we must assume that the
root process is never a Byzantine one). It is obvious that these Byzantine processes may disturb
some correct processes. It is why we relax the problem in the following way: we want to construct
a maximum metric forest with respect toM. The root of any tree of this forest must be either the
real root or a Byzantine process.
Each process v has three O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prntv ∈ Nv ∪ {⊥}),
a level which stores its current metric value (levelv ∈ M) and an integer which stores a distance
(distv ∈ N). Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb (at least) their neighbors. We use the
following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over
the system S and two processes u and v, we denote by µ(u, v) the maximum metric of node u when
v plays the role of the root of the system. If u and v are neighbors, we denote by wu,v the weight
of the edge {u, v} (that is, the value of wf({u, v})).
Definition 24 (M-path) Given an assigned metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺, wf) over a system
S, a path (v0, . . . , vk) (k ≥ 1) of S is a M-path if and only if:
1. prntv0 = ⊥, levelv0 = mr, distv0 = 0, and v0 ∈ B ∪ {r},
2. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, prntvi = vi−1 and levelvi = met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1),
3. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1) = max≺
u∈Nv
{met(levelu, wvi,u)},
4. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, distvi = legal distvi−1 with ∀u ∈ Nv, legal distu =
{
distu + 1 if levelv = levelu
0 otherwise
,
and
5. levelvk = µ(vk, v0).
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We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the maximum metric tree construction with
respect to a maximizable metric M as follows.
spec(v) :
{
prntv = ⊥ and levelv = mr, and distv = 0 if v is the root r
there exists a M-path (v0, . . . , vk) such that vk = v otherwise
2.4 Previous results
In this section, we summarize known results about maximum metric tree construction. The first
interesting result about maximizable metrics is due to [10] that provides a fully characterization of
maximizable metrics as follow.
Definition 25 (Boundedness) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is bounded if and only if: ∀m ∈
M,∀w ∈W,met(m,w) ≺ m or met(m,w) = m
Definition 26 (Monotonicity) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is monotonic if and only if: ∀(m,
m′) ∈M2,∀w ∈W,m ≺ m′ ⇒ (met(m,w) ≺ met(m′, w) or met(m,w) = met(m′, w))
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [10]) A metric is maximizable if and
only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Secondly, [9] provides a self-stabilizing protocol to construct a maximum metric tree with respect
to any maximizable metric. Now, we focus on self-stabilizating solutions resilient to Byzantine
faults. Following discussion of Section 2, it is obvious that there exists no strictly stabilizing
protocol for this problem. If we consider the weaker notion of topology-aware strict stabilization,
[5] defines the best containment area as:
SB = {v ∈ V \B |µ(v, r)  max≺{µ(v, b), b ∈ B}} \ {r}
Intuitively, SB gathers correct processes that are closer (or at equal distance) from a Byzantine
process than the root according to the metric. Moreover, [5] proves that the algorithm introduced
for the maximum metric spanning tree construction in [9] performed this optimal containment area.
More formally, [5] proves the following results.
Theorem 2 ([5]) Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central
daemon, there exists no (AB , 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree
construction with respect to M where AB  SB.
Theorem 3 ([5]) Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the protocol of [9] is a
(SB , n − 1)-TA strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with
respect to M.
Some other works try to circumvent the impossibility result of strict stabilization using the
concept ot strong stabilization but do not provide results for any maximizable metric. Indeed, [7]
proves the following result about spanning tree.
Theorem 4 ([7]) There exists a (t, 0, n−1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric span-
ning tree construction with respect to NC (that is, for a spanning tree with no particular constraints)
with a finite t.
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On the other hand, regarding BFS spanning tree construction, [6] proved the following impos-
sibility result.
Theorem 5 ([6]) Even under the central daemon, there exists no (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing pro-
tocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t and c are two
finite integers.
Now, if we focus on topology-aware strong stabilization, [6] introduced the following containment
area: S∗B = {v ∈ V |min
b∈B
(d(v, b)) < d(r, v)}, and proved the following results.
Theorem 6 ([6]) Even under the central daemon, there exists no (t, A∗B , 1)-TA strongly stabilizing
protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where A∗B  S
∗
B and
t is a finite integer.
Theorem 7 ([6]) The protocol of [11] is a (t, S∗B , n− 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for max-
imum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t is a finite integer.
The main motivation of this work is to fill the gap between results about TA strong and strong
stabilization in the general case (that is, for any maximizable metric). Mainly, we define the best
possible containment area for TA strong stabilization, we propose a protocol that provides this
containment area and we characterize the set of metrics that allow strong stabilization.
3 Impossibility Results
In this section, we provide our impossibility results about containment radius (respectively area)
of any strongly stabilizing (respectively TA strongly stabilizing) protocol for the maximum metric
tree construction.
3.1 Strong Stabilization
We introduce here some new definitions to characterize some important properties of maximizable
metrics that are used in the following.
Definition 27 (Strictly decreasing metric) A metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) is strictly de-
creasing if, for any metric value m ∈M , the following property holds: either ∀w ∈W,met(m,w) ≺
m or ∀w ∈W,met(m,w) = m.
Definition 28 (Fixed point) A metric valuem is a fixed point of a metricM = (M,W,mr,met,≺
) if m ∈M and if for any value w ∈W , we have: met(m,w) = m.
Then, we define a specific class of maximizable metrics and we prove that it is impossible to
construct a maximum metric tree in a strongly-stabilizing way if we do not consider such a metric.
Definition 29 (Strongly maximizable metric) A maximizable metricM = (M,W,mr,met,≺
) is strongly maximizable if and only if |M | = 1 or if the following properties holds:
• |M | ≥ 2,
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• M is strictly decreasing, and
• M has one and only one fixed point.
Note that NC is a strongly maximizable metric (since |M4| = 1) whereas BFS or SP are not
(since the first one has no fixed point, the second is not strictly decreasing). If we consider the
metric MET defined below, we can show that MET is a strongly maximizable metric such that
|M | ≥ 2.
MET = (M5,W5,met5,mr5,≺5)
where M5 = {0, 1, 2, 3}
W5 = {1}
met5(m,w) = max{0,m −w}
mr5 = 3
≺5 is the classical < relation
Now, we can state our first impossibility result.
Theorem 8 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central dae-
mon, there exists no (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree con-
struction with respect to M for any finite integer t if:{
M is not a strongly maximizable metric, or
c < |M | − 2
Proof We prove this result by contradiction. We assume that M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) is a
maximizable metric such that there exist a finite integer t and a protocol P that is a (t, c, 1)-
strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to M.
We distinguish the following cases (note that they are exhaustive):
Case 1: M is a strongly maximizing metric and c < |M | − 2.
As c ≥ 0, we know that |M | ≥ 2 and by definition of a strongly stabilizing metric, M is
strictly decreasing and has one and only one fixed point.
By assumption onM, we know that there exist c+3 distinct metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,
mc+2 inM and w0, w1, . . . , wc+1 inW such that: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c+2},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1) ≺
mi−1.
Let S = (V,E,W) be the following weighted system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 = b},
E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c+2}} and ∀i ∈ {0, c+1}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = wi. Note
that the choice wpc+1,pc+2 = wc+1 ensures us the following property when levelr = levelb =
mr: µ(pc+1, b) ≺ µ(pc+1, r) (and by symmetry, µ(pc+2, r) ≺ µ(pc+2, b)). Process p0 is the
real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Note that the construction of W ensures the
following properties when levelr = levelb = mr: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, µ(pi, r) = µ(p2c+3−i, b),
µ(pi, b) ≺ µ(pi, r) and µ(p2c+3−i, r) ≺ µ(p2c+3−i, b).
Assume that the initial configuration ρ0 of S satisfies: prntr = prntb = ⊥, levelr = levelb =
mr, and other variables of b (in particular dist) are identical to those of r (see Figure 1,
variables of other processes may be arbitrary). Assume now that b takes exactly the same
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Figure 1: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 8, case 1.
actions as r (if any) immediately after r. Then, by symmetry of the execution and by
convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration
ρ1 (see Figure 1) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c+1}, prntpi = pi−1, levelpi = µ(pi, r) = mi, distpi =
legal distprntpi and ∀i ∈ {c + 2, . . . , 2c + 2}, prntpi = pi+1, levelpi = µ(pi, b) = m2c+3−i, and
distpi = legal distprntpi (because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process
v satisfies spec(v) when prntr = prntb = ⊥ and levelr = levelb = mr by construction of W).
Note that ρ1 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process acts as a correct process and executes correctly
its algorithm. Then, by convergence of P in fault-free systems (remember that a strongly-
stabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm), we can deduce that the
system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ2 (see Figure 1) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2c +
3}, prntpi = pi−1, levelpi = µ(pi, r), and distpi = legal distprntpi (because this configuration
is the only one in which all process v satisfies spec(v)). Note that the portion of execution
between ρ1 and ρ2 contains at least one c-perturbation (pc+2 is a c-correct process and modifies
at least once its O-variables) and that ρ2 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
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Figure 2: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 8, cases 2 and 3.
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prntb = ⊥ and levelb =
mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ3 (see Figure 1). From this configuration,
we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ0. By the same token, we obtain an
execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ1) and an infinite
number of c-perturbation which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization of P.
Case 2: M is not strictly decreasing.
By definition, we know thatM is not a strongly maximizable metric. Hence, we have |M | ≥ 2.
Then, the definition of a strictly decreasing metric implies that there exists a metric value
m ∈ M such that: ∃w ∈ W, met(m,w) = m and ∃w′ ∈ W,m′ = met(m,w′) ≺ m (and thus
m is not a fixed point of M). By the utility condition on M , we know that there exists a
sequence of metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,ml = m in M and w0, w1, . . . , wl−1 in W such
that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1). Denote by k the length of the shortest such
sequence. Note that this implies that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi ≺ mi−1 (otherwise we can remove
mi from the sequence and this is contradictory with the construction of k). We distinguish
the following cases:
Case 2.1: k ≥ c+ 2.
We can use the same token as case 1 above by using w′ instead of wc+1 in the case where
k = c+ 2 (since we know that met(m,w′) ≺ m).
Case 2.2: k < c+ 2.
Let S1 = (V,E,W) be the following weighted system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 =
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b}, E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c+ 2}}, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i =
wi, ∀i ∈ {k, . . . , c}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = w and wpc+1,pc+2 = w
′ (see Figure 2).
Note that this choice ensures us the following property when levelr = levelb = mr:
µ(pc+1, b) ≺ µ(pc+1, r) (and by symmetry, µ(pc+2, r) ≺ µ(pc+2, b)). Process p0 is the
real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Note that the construction of W ensures
the following properties when levelr = levelb = mr: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, µ(pi, r) =
µ(p2c+3−i, b), µ(pi, b) ≺ µ(pi, r) and µ(p2c+3−i, r) ≺ µ(p2c+3−i, b).
This construction allows us to follow the same proof as in case 1 above.
Case 3: M has no or more than two fixed point, and is strictly decreasing.
If M has no fixed point and is strictly decreasing, then |M | is not finite and then, we can
apply the result of case 1 above since c is a finite integer.
If M has two or more fixed points and is strictly decreasing, denote by Υ and Υ′ two fixed
points of M. Without loss of generality, assume that Υ ≺ Υ′. By the utility condition on
M , we know that there exists sequences of metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,ml = Υ and
m′0 = mr,m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
l′ = Υ
′ in M and w0, w1, . . . , wl−1 and w
′
0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l′−1 in W such
that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1) and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l
′},m′i = met(m
′
i−1, w
′
i−1).
Denote by k and k′ the length of shortest such sequences. Note that this implies that
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi ≺ mi−1 and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k
′},m′i ≺ m
′
i−1 (otherwise we can remove mi or
m′i from the corresponding sequence). We distinguish the following cases:
Case 3.1: k > c+ 2 or k′ > c+ 2.
Without loss of generality, assume that k > c + 2 (the second case is similar). We can
use the same token as case 1 above.
Case 3.2: k ≤ c+ 2 and k′ ≤ c+ 2.
Let w be an arbitrary value of W . Let S2 = (V,E,W) be the following weighted
system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 = b}, E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c + 2}},
∀i ∈ {0, k − 1}, wpi,pi+1 = wi, ∀i ∈ {0, k
′ − 1}, wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = w
′
i and ∀i ∈ {k, 2c+ 2−
k′}, wpi,pi+1 = w (see Figure 2). Note that this choice ensures us the following property
when levelr = levelb = mr: µ(pc+1, r) = Υ ≺ Υ
′ = µ(pc+1, b) and µ(pc+2, r) = Υ ≺
Υ′ = µ(pc+2, b). Process p0 is the real root and process b is a Byzantine one.
This construction allows us to follow a similar proof as in case 1 above (note that any
process u which satisfies µ(u, r) ≺ Υ′ will be disturb infinitely often, in particular at
least pc+1 and pc+2 which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization of P).
In any case, we show that there exists a system which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization
of P that ends the proof. 
3.2 Topology Aware Strong Stabilization
First, we generalize the set S∗B previously defined for the BFS metric in [6] to any maximizable
metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺).
S∗B =
{
v ∈ V \B
∣∣∣∣µ(v, r) ≺ max≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)}
}
15
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
✒✑
✓✏
r r
bb S
∗
B
SB
SB = S
∗
B
mr=0 mr=0
levelb = 0 levelb = 0
7 6
5
410
8
6
3216
0 0
0
00
00
0
0
Figure 3: Examples of containment areas for SP.
Intuitively, S∗B gathers the set of corrects processes that are strictly closer (according to M)
to a Byzantine process than the root. Figures from 3 to 5 provide some examples of containment
areas with respect to several maximizable metrics and compare it to SB, the optimal containment
area for TA strict stabilization.
Note that we assume for the sake of clarity that V \ S∗B induces a connected subsystem. If it
is not the case, then S∗B is extended to include all processes belonging to connected subsystems of
V \ S∗B that not include r.
Now, we can state our generalization of Theorem 6.
Theorem 9 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central dae-
mon, there exists no (t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree
construction with respect to M where A∗B  S
∗
B and t is a given finite integer.
Proof Let M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) be a maximizable metric and P be a (t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strongly
stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction protocol with respect to M
where A∗B  S
∗
B and t is a finite integer. We must distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: |M | = 1.
Denote by m the metric value such that M = {m}. For any system and for any process v, we
have µ(v, r) = min≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. Consequently, S∗B = ∅ for any system. Then, it is absurd
to have A∗B  S
∗
B.
Case 2: |M | ≥ 2.
By definition of a bounded metric, we can deduce that there exists m ∈M and w ∈W such
that m = met(mr,w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases:
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Case 2.1: m is a fixed point of M.
Let S be a system such that any edge incident to the root or a Byzantine process has a
weight equals to w. Then, we can deduce that we have: m = max≺
b∈B
{µ(r, b)} ≺ µ(r, r) =
mr and for any correct process v 6= r, µ(v, r) = max≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. Hence, S∗B = ∅ for
any such system. Then, it is absurd to have A∗B  S
∗
B .
Case 2.2: m is not a fixed point of M.
This implies that there exists w′ ∈ W such that: met(m,w′) ≺ m (remember that M
is bounded). Consider the following system: V = {r, u, u′, v, v′, b}, E = {{r, u}, {r, u′},
{u, v}, {u′, v′}, {v, b}, {v′ , b}}, wr,u = wr,u′ = wv,b = wv′,b = w, and wu,v = wu′,v′ = w
′
(b is a Byzantine process). We can see that S∗B = {v, v
′}. Since A∗B  SB, we have:
v /∈ A∗B or v
′ /∈ A∗B . Consider now the following configuration ρ0: prntr = prntb = ⊥,
levelr = levelb = mr, distr = distb = 0 and prnt, level, and dist variables of other
processes are arbitrary (see Figure 6, other variables may have arbitrary values but
other variables of b are identical to those of r).
Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r
(note that r /∈ A∗B and hence prntr = ⊥, levelr = mr, and distr = 0 still hold by closure
and then prntb = ⊥, levelb = mr, and distr = 0 still hold too). Then, by symmetry
of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system
reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ1 (see Figure 6) in which: prntr = prntb = ⊥,
prntu = prntu′ = r, prntv = prntv′ = b, levelr = levelb = mr, levelu = levelu′ =
levelv = levelv′ = m, and ∀v ∈ V, distv = legal distprntv (because this configuration is
the only one in which all correct process v satisfies spec(v) when prntr = prntb = ⊥ and
levelr = levelb = mr since met(m,w
′) ≺ m). Note that ρ1 is A
∗
B-legitimate for spec and
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Figure 5: Examples of containment areas for R.
A∗B-stable (whatever A
∗
B is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct processor with respect to P. Then, by con-
vergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ1 which is not legitimate (remember
that a TA-strongly stabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm),
we can deduce that the system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ2 (see Figure 6)
in which: prntr = ⊥, prntu = prntu′ = r, prntv = u, prntv′ = u
′, prntb = v (or
prntb = v
′), levelr = mr, levelu = levelu′ = m levelv = levelv′ = met(m,w
′) = m′,
levelb = met(m
′, w) = m′′, and ∀v ∈ V, distv = legal distprntv . Note that processes v
and v′ modify their O-variables in the portion of execution between ρ1 and ρ2 and that
ρ2 is A
∗
B-legitimate for spec and A
∗
B-stable (whatever A
∗
B is). Consequently, this portion
of execution contains at least one A∗B-TA-disruption (whatever A
∗
B is).
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prntb = ⊥ and
levelb = mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ3 (see Figure 6). From this
configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ0. By the same token,
we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see
ρ1) and an infinite number of A
∗
B-TA-disruption (whatever A
∗
B is) which contradicts the
(t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strong stabilization of P.

4 Topology-Aware Strongly Stabilizing Protocol
The goal of this section is to provide a (t, S∗B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol in order to
match the lower bound on containment area provided by the Theorem 9. If we focus on the protocol
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Figure 6: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 9.
provided by [5] (which is (SB , n− 1)-TA strictly stabilizing), we can prove that this protocol does
not satisfy our constraints since we have the following result.
Theorem 10 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the protocol of [5] is not
a (t, S∗B , 2)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with
respect to M where t is a given finite integer.
Proof To prove this result, it is sufficient to construct an execution of the protocol of [5] for a given
metric M which contains an infinite number of S∗B-TA disruptions with two Byzantine processes.
Consider the shortest path metric SP defined above and the weighted system defined by Figure
7 (r denotes the root and b1 and b2 are two Byzantine processes). We recall that the protocol of [5]
uses an upper bound D on the length of any path of the tree and that the protocol is built in such
a way that a process cannot choose as parent a neighbor with a dist variable greater or equals to
D − 1. Here, we assume that D = 10.
If we consider the initial configuration ρ1 defined by Figure 8, we can state that processes
p2 and p3 cannot modify their state as long as b1 remains in its state. Moreover, r and p1 are
never enabled by the protocol. In this way, it is possible to construct the following portion of
execution e1: b2 modifies its level variable to 1. Then, p5 and p4 update their level variable to
obtain configuration ρ2 of Figure 8. Note that e1 contains a S
∗
B-TA disruption since p4 modified
one of its O-variables (namely, level) and p4 /∈ S
∗
B. From ρ2, it is possible to construct the following
portion of execution e2: b2 modifies its level variable to 0. Then, p5 and p4 update their level
variable to obtain configuration ρ1.
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Figure 7: System used in proof of Theorem 10.
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Figure 8: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 10 (for each process v, we use the notation
levelv / distv).
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Consequently, it is possible to construct an infinite execution e1e2e1e2 . . . starting from ρ1 that
contains an infinite number of S∗B-TA disruptions with two Byzantine processes. This finishes the
proof.

4.1 Presentation of the Protocol
In contrast of Theorem 10, we provide in this paper a new protocol which is (t, S∗B , n−1)-TA strongly
stabilizing for maximum metric spanning tree construction. Our protocol needs a supplementary
assumption on the system. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 30 (Set of used metric values) Given an assigned metric AM = (M,W,met,mr,≺
, wf) over a system S, the set of used metric values of AM is defined as M(S) = {m ∈ M |∃v ∈
V, (µ(v, r) = m) ∨ (∃b ∈ B,µ(v, b) = m)}.
We assume that we always have |M(S)| ≥ 2 (the necessity of this assumption is explained below).
Nevertheless, note that the contrary case (|M(S)| = 1) is possible if and only if the assigned metric
is equivalent to NC. As the protocol of [7] performs (t, 0, n− 1)- strong stabilization with a finite t
for this metric, we can achieves the (t, S∗B , n − 1)-TA strong stabilization when |M(S)| = 1 (since
this implies that S∗B = ∅). In this way, this assumption does not weaken the possibility result.
Although the protocol of [5] is not TA strongly stabilizing (see Theorem 10), our protocol
borrows fundamental strategy from it. In this protocol, any process try to maximize its level in the
tree by choosing as its parent the neighbor that provide the best metric value. The key idea of this
protocol is to use the distance variable (upper bounded by a given constant D) to detect and break
cycles of process which has the same maximum metric. To achieve the TA strict stabilization, the
protocol ensures a fair selection along the set of its neighbor with a round-robin order.
The possibility of infinite number of disruptions of the protocol of [5] mainly comes from the
following fact: a Byzantine process can independently lie about its level and its dist variable. For
example, a Byzantine process can provide a level equals to mr and a dist arbitrarily large. In this
way, it may lead a correct process of SB \ S
∗
B to have a dist variable equals to D − 1 such that
no other correct process can choose it as its parent (this rule is necessary to break cycle) but it
cannot modify its state (this rule is only enabled when dist is equals to D). Then, this process
may always prevent some of its neighbors to join a M-path connected to the root and hence allow
another Byzantine process to perform an infinite number of disruptions.
It is why we modified the management of the dist variable (note that others variables are
managed exactly in the same way as in the protocol of [5]). In order to contain the effect of
Byzantine process on dist variables, each process that has a level different from the one of its
parent in the tree sets its dist variable to 0. In this way, a Byzantine process modifying its dist
variable can only affect correct process that have the same level. Consequently, in the case where
|M(S)| ≥ 2, we are ensured that correct processes of SB \ S
∗
B cannot keep a dist variable equals
or greater than D− 1 infinitely. Hence, a correct process of SB \ S
∗
B cannot be disturbed infinitely
often without joining a M-path connected to the root.
We can see that the assumption |M(S)| ≥ 2 is essential to perform the topology-aware strong
stabilization. Indeed, in the case where |M(S)| = 1, Byzantine processes can play exactly the
scenario described above (in this case, our protocol is equivalent to the one of [5]).
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The second modification we bring to the protocol of [5] follows. When a process has an incon-
sistent dist variable with its parent, we allow it only to increase its dist variable. If the process
needs to decrease its dist variable (when it has a strictly greater distance than its parent), then the
process must change its parent. This rule allows us to bound the maximal number of steps of any
process between two modifications of its parent (a Byzantine process cannot lead a correct one to
infinitely often increase and decrease its distance without modifying its pointer).
Our protocol is formally described in Algorithm 4.1.
algorithm 4.1 SSMAX , TA strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric tree construction.
Data:
Nv: totally ordered set of neighbors of v.
D: upper bound of the number of processes in a simple path.
Variables:
prntv ∈
{
{⊥} if v = r
Nv if v 6= r
: pointer on the parent of v in the tree.
levelv ∈ {m ∈M |m  mr}: metric of the node.
distv ∈ {0, . . . ,D}: hop counter.
Functions:
For any subset A ⊆ Nv, choosev(A) returns the first element of A which is bigger than prntv (in a round-robin fashion).
current distv() =
{
0 if levelprntv 6= levelv
min(distprntv + 1, D) if levelprntv = levelv
Rules:
(Rr) :: (v = r) ∧ ((levelv 6= mr) ∨ (distv 6= 0)) −→ levelv := mr; distv := 0
(R1) :: (v 6= r) ∧ (prntv ∈ Nv) ∧ ((distv < current distv()) ∨ (levelv 6= met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )))
−→ levelv := met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ); distv := current distv()
(R2) :: (v 6= r) ∧ ((distv = D) ∨ (distv > current distv())) ∧ (∃u ∈ Nv, distu < D − 1)
−→ prntv := choosev({u ∈ Nv|distv < D− 1}); levelv := met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ); distv := current distv()
(R3) :: (v 6= r) ∧ (∃u ∈ Nv, (distu < D − 1) ∧ (levelv ≺ met(levelu, wu,v)))
−→ prntv := choosev
({
u ∈ Nv
∣∣∣(levelu < D−1)∧(met(levelu , wu,v) = max≺
q∈Nv/levelq<D−1
{met(levelq , wq,v)})
})
;
levelv := met(levelprntv , wprntv,v); distv := current distv()
4.2 Proof of the (SB, n− 1)-TA Strict Stabilization for spec
This proof is similar to the one of [5] but we must modify it to take in account modifications of the
protocol. In [5], we proved the following useful property about maximizable metrics.
Lemma 1 For any process v ∈ V , we have:
∀u ∈ Nv,met
(
max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v
)
 max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)}
Given a configuration ρ ∈ C and a metric value m ∈M , let us define the following predicate:
IMm(ρ) ≡ ∀v ∈ V, levelv  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
}
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Lemma 2 For any metric value m ∈M , the predicate IMm is closed by actions of SSMAX .
Proof Let m be a metric value (m ∈M). Let ρ ∈ C be a configuration such that IMm(ρ) = true
and ρ′ ∈ C be a configuration such that ρ
R
7→ ρ′ is a step of SSMAX .
If the root process r ∈ R (respectively a Byzantine process b ∈ R), then we have levelr = mr
(respectively levelb  mr) in ρ
′ by construction of (Rr) (respectively by definition of levelb). Hence,
levelr  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(r, u)}
}
= mr (respectively levelb  max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(b, u)}
}
=
mr).
If a correct process v ∈ R with v 6= r, then there exists a neighbor p of v such that levelp 
max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}
}
in ρ (since IMm(ρ) = true) and prntv = p and levelv = met(levelp,
wv,p) in ρ
′ (since v is activated during this step).
If we apply the Lemma 1 to met and to neighbor p, we obtain the following property:
met
(
max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}, wv,p
)
 max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
Consequently, we obtain that, in ρ′:
levelv = met(levelp, wv,p)
 met
(
max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}
}
, wv,p
)
by monotonicity of M
 max≺
{
met(m,wv,p),met
(
max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(p, u)}, wv,p
)}
 max≺
{
m, max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)}
}
since met(m,wv,p)  m
We can deduce that IMm(ρ
′) = true, that concludes the proof. 
Given an assigned metric to a system G, we can observe that the set of metrics value M is
finite and that we can label elements of M by m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,mk in a way such that ∀i ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1},mi+1 ≺ mi.
We introduce the following notations:
∀mi ∈M, Pmi =
{
v ∈ V \ SB
∣∣µ(v, r) = mi}
∀mi ∈M, Vmi =
i⋃
j=0
Pmj
∀mi ∈M, Imi =
{
v ∈ V
∣∣ max≺
u∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, u)} ≺ mi
}
∀mi ∈M, LCmi =
{
ρ ∈ C
∣∣(∀v ∈ Vmi , spec(v)) ∧ (IMmi(ρ))}
LC = LCmk
Lemma 3 For any mi ∈M , the set LCmi is closed by actions of SSMAX .
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Proof Let mi be a metric value from M and ρ be a configuration of LCmi . By construction, any
process v ∈ Vmi satisfies spec(v) in ρ.
In particular, the root process satisfies: prntr = ⊥, levelr = mr, and distr = 0. By construction
of SSMAX , r is not enabled and then never modifies its O-variables (since the guard of the rule
of r does not involve the state of its neighbors).
In the same way, any process v ∈ Vmi satisfies: prntv ∈ Nv, levelv = met(levelprntv , wprntv,v),
distv = legal distprntv , and levelv = max≺
u∈Nv
{met(levelu, wu,v)}. Note that, as v ∈ Vmi and spec(v)
holds in ρ, we have: levelv = µ(v, r) = max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} and distv ≤ D − 1 by construction of D.
Hence, process v is not enabled in ρ.
Assume that there exists a process v ∈ Vmi that takes a step ρ
′ R7→ ρ′′ in an execution starting
from ρ (without loss of generality, assume that v is the first process of v ∈ Vmi that takes a step in
this execution). Then, we know that v 6= r. This activation implies that a neighbor u /∈ Vmi (since
v is the first process of Vmi to take a step) of v modified its levelu variable to a metric value m ∈M
such that levelv ≺ met(m,wu,v) in ρ
′ (note that O-variables of v and prntv remain consistent since
v is the first process to take a step in this execution).
Hence, we have levelv = max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} = µ(v, r) (since spec(v) holds), levelv ≺ met(m,wu,v)
(since u causes an action of v), and mi  levelv (since v ∈ Vmi and levelv = µ(v, r)). Moreover, the
closure of IMmi (established in Lemma 2) ensures us thatm = levelu  max≺
{
mi, max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}
}
.
Let us study the two following cases:
Case 1: max≺
{
mi, max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}
}
= mi.
We have then m  mi. As the boundedness of M ensures that met(m,wu,v)  m, we can
conclude that levelv ≺ met(m,wu,v)  m  mi  levelv , that is absurd.
Case 2: max≺
{
mi, max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}
}
= max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}.
We have thenm  max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}. By monotonicity ofM, we can deduce thatmet(m,wu,v) 
met( max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v). Consequently, we obtain that max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(v, p)} ≺ met( max≺
p∈B∪{r}
{µ(u, p)}, wu,v).
This is contradictory with the result of Lemma 1.
In conclusion, any process v ∈ Vmi takes no step in any execution starting from ρ and then
always satisfies spec(v). Then, the closure of IMB (established in Lemma 2) concludes the proof.

Lemma 4 Any configuration of LC is (SB , n− 1)-TA contained for spec.
Proof This is a direct application of the Lemma 3 to LC = LCmk . 
Lemma 5 Starting from any configuration of C, any execution of SSMAX reaches in a finite
time a configuration of LCmr.
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Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. Then, it is obvious that IMmr(ρ) is satisfied. By closure
of IMmr (proved in Lemma 2), we know that IMmr remains satisfied in any execution starting from
ρ.
If r does not satisfy spec(r) in ρ, then r is continuously enabled. Since the scheduling is strongly
fair, r is activated in a finite time and then r satisfies spec(r) in a finite time. Denote by ρ′ the first
configuration in which spec(r) holds. Note that r takes no step in any execution starting from ρ′.
The boundedness of M implies that Pmr induces a connected subsystem. If Pmr = {r}, then
we proved that ρ′ ∈ LCmr and we have the result.
Otherwise, observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ′, if all processes
of Pmr are not enabled, then all processes v of Pmr satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists
an execution e starting from ρ′ in which some processes of Pmr take infinitely many steps. By
construction, at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u which takes only a finite
number of steps in e (recall that Pmr induces a connected subsystem and that r takes no step in
e). After u takes its last step of e, we can observe that levelu = mr and distu < D − 1 (otherwise,
u is activated in a finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R1) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of
distv is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R2) or (R3) infinitely often. In both cases,
u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose. By the fairness of this function, we
can deduce that prntv = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is never
enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that
all processes of Pmr are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LCmr, that
ends the proof. 
Lemma 6 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that:
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒ distv = D
Proof Let mi be an arbitrary metric value of M and ρ0 be an arbitrary configuration of LCmi .
Let e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an execution starting from ρ0.
Note that ρ0 satisfies IMmi by construction. Hence, we have ∀v ∈ Imi , levelv  mi. The closure
of IMmi (proved in Lemma 2) ensures us that this property is satisfied in any configuration of e.
If any process v ∈ Imi satisfies levelv ≺ mi in ρ0, then the result is obvious. Otherwise, we
define the following variant function. For any configuration ρj of e, we denote by Aj the set of
processes v of Imi such that levelv = mi in ρj. Then, we define f(ρj) = min
v∈Aj
{distv}. We will prove
the result by showing that there exists an integer k such that f(ρk) = D.
First, if a process v joins Aj (that is, v /∈ Aj−1 but v ∈ Aj), then it takes a distance value
greater or equals to f(ρj−1) + 1 by construction of the protocol. We can deduce that any process
that joins Aj does not decrease f . Moreover, the construction of the protocol implies that a process
v such that v ∈ Aj and v ∈ Aj+1 can not decrease its distance value in the step ρj 7→ ρj+1.
Then, consider for a given configuration ρj a process v ∈ Aj such that distv = f(ρj) < D. We
claim that v is enabled in ρj and that the execution of the enabled rule either increases strictly
distv or removes v from Aj+1. We distinguish the following cases:
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Case 1: levelv = met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )
The fact that v ∈ Imi , the boundedness ofM and the closure of IMmi imply that prntv ∈ Aj
(and, hence that levelprntv = mi). Then, by construction of f(ρj), we know that distprntv ≥
f(ρj) = distv. Hence, we have distv < distprntv + 1 in ρj . Then, v is enabled by (R1) in ρj
and distv increases of at least 1 during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1 if this rule is executed.
Case 2: levelv 6= met(levelprntv , wv,prntv )
Assume that v is activated by (R2) or (R3) during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1. If v does not belong
to Aj+1 (if levelv 6= mi in ρj+1), the claim is satisfied. In the contrary case (v belongs to
Aj+1), we know that levelv = mi in ρj+1. The boundedness of M and the closure of IMmi
imply that levelprntv = mi in ρj+1. We can conclude that distv increases of at least 1 during
the step ρj 7→ ρj+1 since the new parent of v has a distance greater than f(ρj) by construction
of Aj+1.
Otherwise, we know that the rule (R1) is enabled for v in ρj . If this rule is executed during
the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, one of the two following sub cases appears.
Case 2.1: met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) ≺ mi in ρj.
Then, v does not belong to Aj+1 by definition.
Case 2.2: met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) = mi in ρj.
Remind that the closure of IMmi implies then that levelprntv = mi. By construction of
f(ρj), we have distprntv ≥ f(ρj) in ρj. Then, we can see that distv increases of at least
1 during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1.
In all cases, v is enabled (at least by (R1)) in ρj and the execution of the enabled rule either
increases strictly distv or removes v from Aj+1.
As Imi is finite and the scheduling is strongly fair, we can deduce that f increases in a finite
time in any execution starting from ρj. By repeating the argument at most D times, we can deduce
that e contains a configuration ρk such that f(ρk) = D, that shows the result. 
Lemma 7 For any mi ∈M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi such that ∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒
distv = D, any execution of SSMAX starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such
that:
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv ≺ mi
Proof Let mi ∈ M be an arbitrary metric value and ρ0 be a configuration of LCmi such that
∀v ∈ Imi , levelv = mi ⇒ distv = D. Let e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an arbitrary execution starting from ρ0.
For any configuration ρj of e, let us denote Eρj = {v ∈ Imi |levelv = mi}. By the closure of
IMmi (which holds by definition in ρ0) established in Lemma 2, we obtain the result if there exists
a configuration ρj of e such that Eρj = ∅.
If there exist some processes v ∈ Imi \ Eρ0 (and hence levelv ≺ mi) such that prntv ∈ Eρ0
and met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) = mi in ρ0, then we can observe that these processes are continuously
enabled by (R1). As the scheduling is strongly fair, v activates this rule in a finite time and then,
levelv = mi and distv = D. In other words, v joins Eρl for a given integer l. We can conclude that
there exists an integer k such that the following property (P ) holds: for any v ∈ Imi \ Eρ0 , either
prntv /∈ Eρk or met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) ≺ mi.
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Then, we prove that, for any integer j ≥ k, we have Eρj+1 ⊆ Eρj . For the sake of contradiction,
assume that there exists an integer j ≥ k and a process v ∈ Imi such that v ∈ Eρj+1 and v /∈ Eρj .
Without loss of generality, assume that j is the smallest integer which performs these properties.
Let us study the following cases:
Case 1: v activates (R1) during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1.
Note that the property (P ) still holds in ρj by the construction of j. Hence, we know that
prntv /∈ Eρj in ρj. But in this case, we have: levelprntv ≺ mi. The boundedness ofM implies
that levelv = met(levelprntv , wv,prntv) ≺ mi in ρj+1 that contradicts the fact that v ∈ Eρj+1 .
Case 2: v activates either (R2) or (R3) during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1.
That implies v chooses a new parent which has a distance smaller than D − 1 in ρj . This
implies that this new parent does not belongs to Eρj . Then, we have levelprntv ≺ mi.
The boundedness of M implies that levelv = met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) ≺ mi in ρj+1 that
contradicts the fact that v ∈ Eρj+1 .
In the two cases, our claim is satisfied. In other words, there exists a point of the execution (namely
ρk) afterwards the set E cannot grow (this implies that, if a process leaves the set E, it is a definitive
leaving).
Assume now that there exists a step ρj 7→ ρj+1 (with j ≥ k) such that a process v ∈ Eρj is
activated. Observe that the closure of IMmi implies that v can not be activated by the rule (R3).
If v activates (R1) during this step, then v modifies its level during this step (otherwise, we have
a contradiction with the fact that levelprntv = mi ⇒ distv = D). The closure of IMmi implies
that v leaves the set E during this step. If v activates (R2) during this step, then v chooses a new
parent which has a distance smaller than D − 1 in ρj . This implies that this new parent does not
belongs to Eρj . Then, we have levelprntv ≺ mi. The boundedness of M implies that levelv ≺ mi
in ρj+1. In other words, if a process of Eρj is activated during the step ρj 7→ ρj+1, then it satisfies
v /∈ Eρj+1 .
Finally, observe that the construction of the protocol and the construction of the bound D
ensures us that any process v ∈ Imi such that distv = D is activated in a finite time. In conclusion,
we obtain that there exists an integer j such that Eρj = ∅, that implies the result. 
Lemma 8 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ′ such that IMmi+1 holds.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 6 and 7. 
Lemma 9 For any mi ∈ M and for any configuration ρ ∈ LCmi , any execution of SSMAX
starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LCmi+1 .
Proof Let mi be a metric value of M and ρ be an arbitrary configuration of LCmi . We know by
Lemma 8 that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ′ such that
IMmi+1 holds. By closure of IMmi+1 and of LCmi (established respectively in Lemma 2 and 3),
we know that any configuration of any execution starting from ρ′ belongs to LCmi and satisfies
IMmi+1 .
We know that Vmi 6= ∅ since r ∈ Vmi for any i ≥ 0. Remind that Vmi+1 is connected by the
boundedness of M. Then, we know that there exists at least one process p of Pmi+1 which has a
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neighbor q in Vmi such that µ(p, r) = met(µ(q, r), wp,q). Moreover, Lemma 3 ensures us that any
process of Vmi takes no step in any executions starting from ρ
′.
Observe that, for any configuration of an execution starting from ρ′, if any process of Pmi+1 is
not enabled, then all processes v of Pmi+1 satisfy spec(v). Assume now that there exists an execution
e starting from ρ′ in which some processes of Pmi+1 take infinitely many steps. By construction,
at least one of these processes (note it v) has a neighbor u such that µ(v, r) = met(µ(u, r), wv,u)
which takes only a finite number of steps in e (recall the construction of p). After u takes its last
step of e, we can observe that levelu = µ(u, r) and distu < D − 1 (otherwise, u is activated in a
finite time that contradicts its construction).
As v can execute consequently (R1) only a finite number of times (since the incrementation of
distv is bounded by D), we can deduce that v executes (R2) or (R3) infinitely often. In both cases,
u belongs to the set which is the parameter of function choose (remind that IMmi+1 is satisfied and
that u has the better possible metric among v’s neighbors). By the construction of this function,
we can deduce that prntv = u in a finite time in e. Then, the construction of u implies that v is
never enabled in the sequel of e. This is contradictory with the construction of e.
Consequently, any execution starting from ρ′ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that
all processes of Pmi+1 are not enabled. We can deduce that this configuration belongs to LCmi+1 ,
that ends the proof. 
Lemma 10 Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMAX reaches a configuration
of LC in a finite time.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 5 that any execution starting
from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration of LCmr = LCm0 . Then, we can apply at most k
times the result of Lemma 9 to obtain that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time
a configuration of LCmk = LC, that proves the result. 
Theorem 11 SSMAX is a (SB, n − 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4 and 10. 
4.3 Proof of the (t, S∗B, n− 1)-TA Strong Stabilization for spec
Let be EB = SB \ S
∗
B (i.e. EB is the set of process v such that µ(v, r) = max
b∈B
{µ(v, b)}). Note that
the subsytem induced by EB may have several connected components. In the following, we use the
following notations: EB = {E
1
B , . . . , E
ℓ
B} where each E
i
B (i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}) is a subset of EB inducing
a maximal connected component, δ(EiB) (i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}) is the diameter of the subsystem induced
by EiB , and δ = max
i∈{0,...,ℓ}
{δ(EiB)}. When a and b are two integers, we define the following function:
Π(a, b) = a
b+1−1
a−1 .
Lemma 11 If ρ is a configuration of LC, then any process v ∈ EB is activated at most Π(k, δ)∆D
times in any execution starting from ρ.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC and e be an execution starting from ρ. Let p be a process
of EiB (i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}) such that there exists a neighbor q which satisfies q ∈ V \ SB and µ(p, r) =
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met(µ(q, r), wp,q) (such a process exists by construction of E
i
B). We are going to prove by induction
on d the following property:
(Pd): if v is a process of E
i
B such that dEiB
(p, v) = d (where dEiB
denotes the distance in the
subsystem induced by EiB), then v executes at most Π(k, d)∆D actions in e.
Initialization: d = 0.
This implies that v = p. Then, by construction, there exists a neighbor q which satisfies
q ∈ V \ SB and µ(p, r) = met(µ(q, r), wp,q). As ρ ∈ LC, Lemma 4 ensures us that levelq =
µ(q, r) and distq < D − 1 in any configuration of e. Then, the boundedness of M implies
that q belongs to the set which is parameter to the macro choose at any execution of rules
(R2) or (R3) by p. Consequently, p executes at most ∆ times rules (R2) and (R3) in e
before choosing q as its parent. Moreover, note that p can execute rule (R1) at most D times
between two consecutive executions of rules (R2) and (R3) (because (R1) only increases
distp which is bounded by D). Consequently, p executes at most ∆D actions before choosing
q as its parent.
By Lemma 4, we know that q takes no action in e. Once p chooses q as its parent, its state
is consistent with the one of q (by construction of rules (R2) and (R3)). Hence, p is never
enabled after choosing q as its parent. Consequently, we obtain that p takes at most ∆D
actions in e, that proves (P0).
Induction: d > 0 and (Pd−1) is true.
Let v be a process of EiB such that dEiB
(p, v) = d. By construction, there exists a neighbor
u of v which belongs to EiB such that dEiB
(p, u) = d − 1. By (Pd−1), we know that u takes
at most Π(k, d− 1)∆D actions in e. The k-boundedness of the daemon allows us to conclude
that v takes at most k × Π(k, d − 1)∆D actions before the last action of u. Then, a similar
reasoning to the one of the initialization part allows us to say that v takes at most ∆D actions
after the last action of u (note that the fact that |M(S)| ≥ 2, the construction of D and the
management of dist variables imply that distu < D−1 after the last step of u). In conclusion,
v takes at most k ×Π(k, d − 1)∆D +∆D = Π(k, d)∆D actions in e, that proves (Pd).
As δ denotes the maximal diameter of connected components of the subsystem induced by EB ,
then we know that dEiB
(p, v) ≤ δ for any process v in EiB . For any process v of EB , there exists
i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ} such that v ∈ EiB . We can deduce that any process of EB takes at most Π(k, δ)∆D
actions in e, that implies the result. 
Lemma 12 If ρ is a configuration of LC and v is a process such that v ∈ EB, then for any execution
e starting from ρ either
1. there exists a configuration ρ′ of e such that spec(v) is always satisfied after ρ′, or
2. v is activated in e.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC and v be a process such that v ∈ EB . By contradiction,
assume that there exists an execution starting from ρ such that (i) spec(v) is infinitely often false
in e and (ii) v is never activated in e.
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For any configuration ρ, let us denote by Pv(ρ) = (v0 = v, v1 = prntv, v2 = prntv1 , . . . , vk =
prntvk−1 , pv = prntvk) the maximal sequence of processes following pointers prnt (maximal means
here that either prntpv = ⊥ or pv is the first process such that there pv = vi for some i ∈ {0, . . . , k}).
Let us study the following cases:
Case 1: prntv ∈ V \ SB in ρ.
Since ρ ∈ LC, prntv satisfies spec(prntv) in ρ and in any execution starting from ρ (by
Lemma 4). Hence, prntv is never activated in e. If v does not satisfy spec(v) in ρ, then we
have levelv 6= met(levelprntv , wv,prntv ) or distv 6= 0 in ρ. Then, v is continuously enabled in e
and we have a contradiction between assumption (ii) and the strong fairness of the scheduling.
This implies that v satisfies spec(v) in ρ. The fact that prntv is never activated in e and that
the state of v is consistent with the one of prntv ensures us that v is never enabled in any
execution starting from ρ. Hence, spec(v) remains true in any execution starting from ρ. This
contradicts the assumption (i) on e.
Case 2: prntv /∈ V \ SB in ρ.
By the assumption (i) on e, we can deduce that there exists infinitely many configurations ρ′
such that a process of Pv(ρ
′) is enabled (since spec(v) is false only when the state of a process
of Pv(ρ
′) is not consistent with the one of its parent that made it enabled). By construction,
the length of Pv(ρ
′) is finite for any configuration ρ′ and there exists only a finite number of
processes in the system. Consequently, there exists at least one process which is infinitely
often enabled in e. Since the scheduler is strongly fair, we can conclude that there exists at
least one process which is infinitely often activated in e.
Let Ae be the set of processes which are infinitely often activated in e. Note that v /∈ Ae
by assumption (ii) on e. Let e′ = ρ′ . . . be the suffix of e which contains only activations of
processes of Ae. Let p be the first process of Pv(ρ
′) which belongs to Ae (p exists since at
least one process of Pv is enabled when spec(v) is false). By construction, the prefix of Pv(ρ
′′)
from v to p in any configuration ρ′′ of e remains the same as the one of Pv(ρ
′). Let p′ be the
process such that prntp′ = p in e
′ (p′ exists since v 6= p implies that the prefix of Pv(ρ
′) from
v to p counts at least two processes). As p is infinitely often activated and as any activation
of p modifies the value of levelp or of distp (at least one of these two variables takes at least
two different values in e′), we can deduce that p′ is infinitely often enabled in e′ (since the
value of levelp′ is constant by construction of e
′ and p). Since the scheduler is strongly fair,
p′ is activated in a finite time in e′, that contradicts the construction of p.
In the two cases, we obtain a contradiction with the construction of e, that proves the result. 
Let LC∗ be the following set of configurations:
LC∗ = {ρ ∈ C |(ρ is S∗B-legitimate for spec) ∧ (IMmk (ρ) = true)}
Note that, as S∗B ⊆ SB , we can deduce that LC
∗ ⊆ LC. Hence, properties of Lemmas 11 and
12 also apply to configurations of LC∗.
Lemma 13 Any configuration of LC∗ is (nΠ(k, δ)∆D,Π(k, δ)∆D,S∗B , n − 1)-TA time contained
for spec.
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Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC∗. As S∗B ⊆ SB , we know by Lemma 4 that any process v of
V \ SB satisfies spec(v) and takes no action in any execution starting from ρ.
Let v be a process of EB . By Lemmas 11 and 12, we know that v takes at most Π(k, δ)∆D
actions in any execution starting from ρ. Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec(v) after its last
action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). Hence, any process of EB
takes at most Π(k, δ)∆D actions and then, there are at most nΠ(k, δ)∆D S∗B-TA-disruptions in
any execution starting from ρ (since |EB | ≤ n).
By definition of a TA time contained configuration, we obtain the result. 
Lemma 14 Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSMAX reaches a configuration
of LC∗ in a finite time.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 10 that any execution starting
from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ′ of LC.
Let v be a process of EB . By Lemmas 11 and 12, we know that v takes at most Π(k, δ)∆D
actions in any execution starting from ρ′. Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec(v) after its
last action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). This implies that any
execution starting from ρ′ reaches a configuration ρ′′ such that any process v of EB satisfies spec(v).
It is easy to see that ρ′′ ∈ LC∗, that ends the proof. 
Theorem 12 SSMAX is a (nΠ(k, δ)∆D,S∗B , n− 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 13 and 14. 
5 Concluding Remarks
We discuss now about the relationship between TA strong and strong stabilization on maximum
metric tree construction. We characterize by a necessary and sufficient condition the set of assigned
metric that allow strong stabilization. Indeed, properties on the metric itself are not sufficient to
conclude on the possibility of strong stabilization: we must know information about the considered
system (assignation of the metric).
Informally, it is possible to construct a maximum metric tree in a strongly stabilizing way if
and only if the considered metric is strongly maximizable and if the desired containment radius is
sufficiently large. More formally,
Theorem 13 Given an assigned metric AM = (M,W,mr,met,≺, wf) over a system S, there
exists a (t, c, n − 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction
with a finite t if and only if:{
(M,W,met,mr,≺) is a strongly maximizable metric, and
c ≥ max{0, |M(S)| − 2}
Proof We split this proof into two parts:
1) Proof of the “if” part: Denote (M,W,met,mr,≺) by M and assume that M is a strongly
maximizable metric and that c ≥ max{0, |M(S)| − 2}. We distinguish the following cases:
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Case 1: |M(S)| = 1 (and hence c ≥ 0).
Denote by m the metric value such that M(S) = {m}. For any correct process v, we have
µ(v, r) = min≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. We can deduce that it is equivalent to construct a maximum
metric spanning tree forM and for NC over this system. By Theorem 4, we know that there
exists a (t, 0, n − 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for this problem with a finite t, that proves
the result.
Case 2: |M(S)| ≥ 2 (and hence c ≥ |M(S)| − 2).
By Theorem 12, we know that there exists a (nΠ(k, δ)∆D,S∗B , n− 1)-TA-strongly stabilizing
protocol P for maximum metric spanning tree construction in this case. Denote by Υ the
only fixed point of M. Let v be a correct process such that v ∈ S∗B .
By definition of S∗B, we have: µ(v, r) ≺ µ(v, b) for at least one Byzantine process b. As M
is strictly decreasing and has only one fixed point, we can deduce that Υ  µ(v, r) and then
µ(v, b) 6= Υ.
Assume that d(v, b) > c ≥ |M(S)| − 2. As M is strictly decreasing, has only one fixed point
Υ, and M has |M(S)| distinct metric values over S, we can conclude that µ(v, b) = Υ. This
contradiction allows us to conclude that there exists a process b such that d(v, b) ≤ c for any
correct process which belongs to S∗B .
In other words, S∗B =
{
v ∈ V |min
b∈B
{d(v, b)} ≤ c
}
and P is in fact a (nΠ(k, δ)∆D, c, n − 1)-
strongly stabilizing protocol, that proves the result with t = nΠ(k, δ)∆D.
2) Proof of the “only if” part: This result is a direct consequence of Theorem 8 when we
observe that |M(S)| ≤ |M | by definition. 
We can now summarize all results about self-stabilizing maximum metric tree construction in
presence of Byzantine faults with the above table. Note that results provided in this paper fill all
gaps pointed out in related works.
M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) is a
maximizable metric
(c, f)-strict stabilization Impossible
(for any c and f) ([15])
(t, c, f)-strong stabilization Possible ⇐⇒
{
M is a strongly maximizable metric, and
c ≥ max{0, |M(S)| − 2}
(for 0 ≤ f ≤ n− 1 and a finite t) (Theorem 13)
(AB, f)-TA strict stabilization Impossible
(for any f and AB  SB) ([5])
(SB, f)-TA strict stabilization Possible
(for 0 ≤ f ≤ n− 1) ([5] and Theorem 11)
(t, AB, f)-TA strong stabilization Impossible
(for any f and AB  S
∗
B) (Theorem 9)
(t, S∗B , f)-TA strong stabilization Possible
(for 0 ≤ f ≤ n− 1 and a finite t) (Theorem 12)
To conclude about results presented in this paper, we must bring some precisions about spec-
ifications. We chose to work with a specification of the problem that consider the dist variable
as a O-variable. This choice may appear strong but it seems us necessary to keep the consistency
32
of results. Indeed, impossibility results of Section 3 can be proved with a weaker specification
that does not consider the dist variable as a O-variable (see [8]). On the other hand, we need the
stronger specification to bound the number of disruptions of the proposed protocol. We postulate
that our protocol is also TA strongly stabilizing with the weaker specification but we do no succeed
to bound exactly the number of disruptions.
The following questions are still open. Is it possible to bound the number of disruptions with
the weaker specification? Is it possible to perform TA strong stabilization with a weaker daemon?
Is it possible to decrease the number of disruptions without loose the optimality of the containment
area?
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